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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the recent Doe 169 v. Brandon decision, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that a church licensing body did not owe a 
duty to protect a minor from the intentional, tortious conduct of a 
third party.1 The court found that the licensing body’s renewal of 
the third party’s ministerial credentials did not create a foreseeable 
risk that the third party would sexually molest the appellant; thus, 
the licensing body had no duty to protect the minor from the third 
party.2 Because the existence of duty is a threshold element, the 
injured party’s negligence claim necessarily failed.3 
As Doe 169 traversed the legal system, the 2011 Domagala v. 
Rolland decision proved crucial.4 In Domagala, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court clarified that, though true only in limited and 
narrow circumstances, it is possible for one actor to owe a duty of 
care to another actor absent a special relationship between the 
 
 1.  Doe 169 v. Brandon (Doe 169 II), 845 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Minn. 2014). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 177, 179. 
 4.  805 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 2011). 
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parties.5 In Doe 169, it was undisputed that no special relationship 
existed between the church licensing body and the injured party.6 
The Domagala exception, therefore, became the linchpin upon 
which the Doe 169 decision would ultimately turn. 
The exception outlined in Domagala may prove outcome 
determinative;7 however, application of this exception necessitates 
scrupulous judicial examination.8 The critical eye will note that the 
Domagala exception is rife with highly subjective threshold issues. 
Under Domagala, the element of duty only exists when the injury in 
question is both (1) foreseeable, and (2) a direct result of an 
actor’s own conduct.9 Each of these threshold issues—duty, 
foreseeability, and misfeasance—are notoriously difficult to apply.10 
The critical eye will also note that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s treatment of Doe 169 did not include the precise, 
painstaking examination integral to a correct application of the 
Domagala exception.11 In Doe 169, the court reiterated that the 
absence of a special relationship between the church licensing 
body and the injured party was not decisive.12 The court then found 
that the licensing body was not, as a matter of law, liable for the 
injury, as the licensing body’s actions did not meet the 
considerable requirements of the Domagala exception.13 While this 
decision falls in line with precedent—Minnesota has been notably 
reluctant to hold third parties liable for involvement in sexual 
 
 5.  Id. at 26 (“[W]hen a person acts in some manner that creates a 
foreseeable risk of injury to another, the actor is charged with an affirmative duty 
to exercise reasonable care to prevent his conduct from harming others.”). 
 6.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 178. 
 7.  See infra Part VI.E. 
 8.  See infra Parts V.B, VI.C–D.  
 9.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
 10.  See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1770 (1998), for a discussion of the ways in which the 
element of duty “is a largely question-begging concept that can be safely used if 
one is not misled by it.” See also infra Part V.B–C for a discussion of the legal 
system’s wary approach to the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction, and infra Part 
VI.C for common criticisms of the foreseeability element.  
 11.  See infra Parts V.A, C.2; VI.A, E. 
 12.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Minn. 2014) (“In Domagala, we 
explained that a duty of care to protect others can arise in two ‘instances.’” 
(quoting Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 22–23 (Minn. 2011))). 
 13.  Id. at 179 (“Applying our case law to the facts and circumstances of this 
particular case, we hold that the District Council did not create a foreseeable risk 
of injury to Doe, and thus the District Council did not owe Doe a duty of care.”). 
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abuse claims14—the court’s rationale suggests a muddled 
understanding of the Domagala exception.15 The court attributes its 
Doe 169 decision to a purported, but largely unsupported, absence 
of foreseeability.16 This attribution is erroneous. Contrary to the 
court’s stated rationale,17 it is the passive nature of the defendant’s 
conduct—the absence of misfeasance—that proves dispositive.18 
Understanding the complexities of the duty element is crucial 
to understanding the blurred rationale behind the Doe 169 
decision. To that end, this note begins with a brief historical 
overview, outlining the development and evolution of the scope of 
duty within the tort of negligence19 and examining this scope of 
duty within the state of Minnesota specifically.20 Next, this note 
presents the facts and procedural posture of the Doe 169 decision,21 
followed by an examination of the legal issues—the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction22 and the foreseeability 
element23—that render the decision something of a conundrum. 
Finally, this note explores the questions left unanswered by the Doe 
169 decision24 and the troubling policy implications of the court’s 
decision to reinstate a summary judgment.25 
 
 14.  See Jonathan J. Hegre, Minnesota “Nice”? Minnesota Mean: The Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s Refusal to Protect Sexually Abused Children in H.B. ex rel. Clarke v. 
Whittemore, 15 LAW & INEQ. 435, 458 (1997) (“By failing to appreciate the unique 
nature and social significance of child sexual abuse, the supreme court’s ruling 
severely limits victims’ collective ability to compel abuse reporting. Until such time 
as [the Minnesota Supreme Court’s] test for special relationships in cases of child 
sexual abuse reporting is properly modified, Minnesota children will continue to 
suffer unnecessarily from the primary and secondary effects of sexual abuse.”). 
 15.  See infra Part VI.E. 
 16.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 179 (“[T]he [defendant] did not create a 
foreseeable risk of injury to a foreseeable plaintiff. Thus, as a matter of law, the 
[defendant] had no duty to [the plaintiff].” (emphasis added)). 
 17.  Id. at 179 n.3 (“Because we decide the issue of duty on foreseeability, we 
need not decide whether what the District Council did or did not do after . . . 
constituted misfeasance or nonfeasance.”). 
 18.  See id. at 179 for the “[s]everal undisputed facts” that support the court’s 
conclusion. See infra Part V.A for a discussion of those factors the court considers 
crucial. 
 19.  See infra Part II. 
 20.  See infra Part III. 
 21.  See infra Part IV. 
 22.  See infra Part V.B–C. 
 23.  See infra Parts VI–VII. 
 24.  See infra Parts VI.E, VII. 
 25.  See infra Part VIII. 
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II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCOPE OF DUTY 
A. The Element of Duty 
As one legal scholar notes, with perhaps a hint of derision, 
“Any first year law student can recite [the rule that] liability in tort 
requires that the defendant have a duty to the plaintiff and that the 
plaintiff’s harm result from a breach of that duty.”26 Specifically, to 
sustain a prima facie claim of negligence, a plaintiff must prove 
four elements: (1) existence of a duty of care, (2) breach of that 
duty, (3) resultant injury, and (4) proximate causation.27 
It is the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance that 
determines whether a duty attaches to an actor’s conduct. 
Misfeasance is “‘active misconduct working positive injury to 
others.’”28 Nonfeasance, meanwhile, is “‘passive inaction or a failure 
to take steps to protect [others] from harm.’”29 There exists a 
general obligation to avoid affirmative actions that pose a likely risk 
of harm, but “[i]naction by a defendant—such as a failure to 
warn—constitutes negligence only when the defendant has a duty 
to act for the protection of others.”30 
B. Duty and Negligence Emerge 
Duty, the distinct obligation “to conform to the legal standard 
of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk,”31 made its 
 
 26.  John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some 
Observations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect 
Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 867, 872 (1991). 
 27.  Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Minn. 2007). 
 28.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Minn. 2014) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON 
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984)); see also ALLAN BEEVER, 
REDISCOVERING THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 211 (2007) (suggesting that defining the 
distinction as being that between “the causing of injury” and “the failure to benefit 
. . . or . . . the failure to prevent harm” is “more helpful”). 
 29.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 178 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, 
§ 56).  
 30.  Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 23 (Minn. 2011) (citing Ruberg v. 
Skelly Oil Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Minn. 1980)); see also FRANCIS H. BOHLEN, 
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 45 (1926) (“[W]hile everyone is bound to refrain 
from action probably injurious to others, no duty to take affirmative precautions 
for the protection of those voluntarily placing themselves in contact with him is 
cast upon anyone . . . .”). 
 31.  Peter F. Lake, Common Law Duty in Negligence Law: The Recent Consolidation 
of a Consensus on the Expansion of the Analysis of Duty and the New Conservative Liability 
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debut at the end of the eighteenth century.32 The development of a 
defined duty standard occurred almost concurrently with the 
emergence of torts as a defined legal field.33 These legal evolutions 
transpired amidst the chaos of the Industrial Revolution. As law 
professor G. Edward White writes, “A standard explanation for the 
emergence of an independent identity for [t]orts . . . is the affinity 
of tort doctrines . . . to the problems produced by 
industrialization.”34 The inventions and innovations of the 
Industrial Revolution—namely, industrial worksites, mass-produced 
products, railroads, and motor vehicles—“had a marvelous, 
unprecedented capacity for smashing the human body.”35 
Unsurprisingly, torts evolved as a cohesive legal mechanism 
designed to provide remedies for the “unprecedented spate of 
accidental deaths and injuries” that came as a grievous 
disadvantage to the rise of modern industry.36 
 
Limiting Use of Policy Considerations, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1503, 1520–22 (1997) 
(citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 166 (2d ed. 1955)) 
(explaining that “duty” has been used by courts to mean: (1) negligence liability, 
(2) general standard of conduct, (3) negligent conduct, and (4) the first element 
of a prima facie negligence case, and further explaining that “‘[d]uty’ as the word 
has been used by courts in this century has had several meanings”).  
 32.  See Jean Elting Rowe & Theodore Silver, The Jurisprudence of Action and 
Inaction in the Law of Tort: Solving the Puzzle of Nonfeasance and Misfeasance from the 
Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Centuries, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 807, 832–33 (1995) 
(“Somewhere in [the court’s] mind . . . there lurked the notion that defendant 
was under a duty not to have behaved as the plaintiff claimed he did. [However,] 
[a]s the eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth, the word negligence 
assumed legal significance . . . . Toward the mid-nineteenth century, the word 
‘duty’ sounded its first cries.”); cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
LAW 350 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that torts was “built up out of old bricks from the 
common-law brickyard” and that many basic tort doctrines pre-dated the 
emergence of torts as a distinct legal field, certainly including the concept of duty 
and moral obligations).  
 33.  See Rowe & Silver, supra note 32, at 827–28. (explaining that modern 
negligence, and, thus, the modern concept of duty, “was born in the early 
nineteenth century”). 
 34.  G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3 
(1980) (“The process by which Torts emerged as a discrete branch of law was 
more complex . . . and less dictated by the demands of industrial enterprise than 
the standard account suggests. . . . [T]his new increase in cases . . . would not have 
been sufficient had it not come at a time when legal scholars were prepared to 
question and discard old bases of legal classification.”). 
 35.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 350. 
 36.  JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD 
INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 15 (2010). 
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C. Duty’s Originally Limited Scope 
Today, the “notion of reasonably foreseeable victims . . . is . . . 
a standard doctrinal test for determining to whom a duty of care is 
owed.”37 The concept that “any person who engages in a course of 
conduct . . . owes a duty to exercise due care against physically 
harming anyone whom he might reasonably foresee physically 
harming were he to perform that conduct carelessly” may seem 
“intuitive.”38 This idea, however, has not always been viewed as 
rational and instinctual. 
In the early days of modern negligence law, scope of duty was 
narrowly defined.39 Originally, an actor was negligent only if he, 
she, or it failed to perform a specific duty.40 An obligation to 
perform a specific duty could be prescribed in three ways41: (1) 
common law, (2) contract,42 or (3) statute.43 In the absence of a 
preexisting duty, however, “[m]ere carelessness, resulting in harm 
to another person, [was] not actionable.”44 
1. Scope of Duty and Industrialization 
This originally narrow scope of duty is commonly attributed to 
fears of economic ruin.45 “Industry . . . seemed to be the foundation 
 
 37.  Id. at 78. 
 38.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 39.  See id. (discussing the movement away from the “older, narrower duty 
rules”). 
 40.  WHITE, supra note 34, at 15. 
 41.  See, e.g., WILLIAM B. HALE, HALE ON TORTS 454 (St. Paul, Minn., West 
Publishing Co. 1896).  
 42.  See id. at 468 (“All persons contracting to do certain things owe a duty not 
to injure the person or property of another while in the performance of the 
contract.”). 
 43.  See id. at 476 (“The statute or ordinance may create, not only a public 
duty, but a duty to private persons, a breach of which may be actionable 
negligence; and yet an individual may not be able to recover, because he is not of 
the class of persons for whose benefit the statute was designed.”). 
 44.  Id. at 454.  
 45.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 350–51. But see Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law 
and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 
1721 (1981) (arguing that this theory is “rudimentary” and illustrative of “rather 
little about the actual common-law objectives” behind the emergence of torts). 
Schwartz contends that the economic limiting theory is not supported by 
contemporary case law, and that, in fact, “nineteenth-century tort law tended to be 
generous in affirming the tort liabilities of emerging industry.” Gary T. Schwartz, 
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on which economic growth, national wealth, and the greater good 
of society rested; and thus industry had to be protected . . . .”46 It 
was feared that “a duty of care grounded in foreseeability was too 
expansive”47 and would impair manufacturers of mass-marketed 
products by exposing them to a seemingly endless pool of potential 
tort victims—customers and employees.48 
2. Winterbottom v. Wright: An Illustrative Case 
The old English case of Winterbottom v. Wright proves illustrative 
of these early limitations.49 The mid-nineteenth century products 
liability action, which “found general acceptance . . . in the United 
States,”50 established the “privity of contract” rule.51 Pursuant to 
Winterbottom’s holding, “a contractor, manufacturer, or vendor 
[was] not liable for injury to third persons who [had] no 
contractual relations with [that contractor, manufacturer, or 
vendor.]”52 
In Winterbottom, the plaintiff-driver was injured while operating 
a mail coach.53 The driver sued the manufacturer, claiming that the 
mail coach was defective.54 The court held that even if the 
manufacturer had negligently constructed and maintained the 
coach, the manufacturer could not be held liable to the driver.55 
The manufacturer had contracted only with the driver’s employer, 
and not with the driver himself. Perhaps in response to concern 
that expanding tort liability would impede manufacturers, and 
consequently the economy,56 the court declared that “[u]nless we 
 
The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641, 641 (1989). 
 46.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 350–51. 
 47.  GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 36, at 79.  
 48.  See id. 
 49.  Winterbottom v. Wright, [Leading Decisions] Online Prod. Liab. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 451 (Exch. June 6, 1842), available at 1842 WL 7800. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See e.g., GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 36, at 79. 
 52.  Winterbottom, [Leading Decisions] Online Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 451. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  But see BEEVER, supra note 28, at 117–18 (2007), for a contrary view of 
Winterbottom’s holding. Beever argues that, despite the wide acceptance of the view 
that Winterbottom’s holding is attributable to fear of impeding industrialization, the 
holding actually was based on (1) “the belief that the law of tort has no room to 
operate when the claimant’s injury was caused by an event covered by contract,” 
8
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confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who 
entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, 
to which [we] can see no limit, would ensue.”57 
3. From Wagons to Automobiles: Expansion of Duty 
The scope of duty was broadened and further defined in an 
early twentieth-century opinion, when Justice Benjamin Cardozo, 
“wielding a mighty axe . . . buried the general [privity] rule.”58 In 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Cardozo underscored that “a duty of 
care and vigilance” extends beyond those with whom one chooses 
to contract.59 Rather than “something one chooses to accept” by 
establishing a contractual relationship, a duty of care “is imposed 
by law for the protection of potential victims.”60 In MacPherson, the 
plaintiff purchased an automobile from Buick Motor Co. with a 
defective wheel that “crumbled.”61 Buick Motor Co. was a 
manufacturer of automobiles, but did not manufacture the 
defective wheel.62 Nevertheless, Cardozo, in a departure from the 
contemporary notion of accountability, found that the company 
should reimburse MacPherson.63 Cardozo wrote: 
If [an actor] is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, 
a liability will follow. . . . We have put aside the notion that 
the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the 
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of 
contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the 
obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in 
the law.64 
With this landmark decision, Justice Cardozo paved the way for 
the current understanding of scope of duty. “The negligence 
principle . . . was not tied to status or vocation or contract, but was 
 
and (2) “the fear of indeterminate liability.” Id. at 118. 
 57.  Winterbottom, [Leading Decisions] Online Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 451. 
 58.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 10, at 1736 (quoting William L. Prosser, 
The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100 
(1960)).  
 59.  217 N.Y. 382, 385 (1916). 
 60.  GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 36, at 80. 
 61.  217 N.Y. at 384–85. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 390–91. 
 64.  Id. at 390. 
9
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a reflection of generalized civil obligations.”65 Though MacPherson 
centered on negligence tied to supplied goods,66 the opinion had 
the larger impact of “extract[ing] negligence from a relational 
context . . . and identif[ying] it with a universal duty of care.”67 
III. SCOPE OF DUTY IN MINNESOTA 
A. Limitations on Duty: Not Our Brother’s Keeper 
Though the scope of duty has expanded significantly, this 
expansion has not continued boundlessly. As the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has noted, “The public has an interest that no man 
shall act so as to injure another, it has no concern that he shall 
benefit anyone.”68 In Minnesota, “we are not our brother’s 
keeper.”69 Ordinarily, “there is no duty to control the conduct of a 
third person to prevent physical harm to another,”70 nor is there a 
duty to protect another person from harm caused by a third 
person.71 
The question of the limitation of the scope of duty has been 
argued extensively. In general, Minnesota courts have found that 
“the prevention of crime is essentially a governmental function” 
and is not the responsibility of average citizens.72 Likewise, “a duty 
to protect against the devious, sociopathic, and unpredictable 
conduct of criminals does not lend itself easily to an ascertainable 
 
 65.  WHITE, supra note 34, at 125.  
 66.  See id.  
 67.  Id. at 127. 
 68.  BOHLEN, supra note 30, at 40, 294 (postulating that this limitation in 
“[the] attitude of extreme individualism so typical of [A]nglo-[S]axon thought” 
encourages individuals to act with self-reliance); cf. Robert Justin Lipkin, 
Comment, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An Individualistic Justification 
of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REV. 252, 254–55 (1983) (recognizing 
“a minimalist conception of the state, whose salient function is proscribing 
harmful conduct, not a person’s failure to act morally” as responsible for the 
limitation). 
 69.  Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 27 (Minn. 1984). 
 70.  Doe v. Brainerd Int’l Raceway, Inc., 533 N.W.2d 617, 621 (Minn. 1995) 
(citing Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993) and Lundgren, 354 
N.W.2d at 27). 
 71.  Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 24 (Minn. 2011). 
 72.  Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 169 (Minn. 1989). 
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standard of care uncorrupted by hindsight nor to a determination 
of causation that avoids speculation.”73 
To this end, a trailer park manager is not required to 
safeguard tenants’ children from a sexually abusive neighbor.74 
Friends are not obligated to keep a watchful eye on an intoxicated 
acquaintance’s physical condition.75 A boat owner does not have to 
warn an adult guest that the water is too shallow for safe diving.76 
B. Exceptions to the General No Duty to Protect Rule 
There are, however, two exceptions to this general rule. A duty 
to protect from foreseeable harm arises when (1) a special 
relationship exists between the parties, or (2) an actor’s own 
conduct creates the risk.77 
To determine whether an injury was foreseeable, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that one must consider 
“whether the specific danger was objectively reasonable to expect, 
not simply whether it was within the realm of any conceivable 
possibility.”78 The risk of foreseeable injury must be “clear to the 
person of ordinary prudence.”79 If the connection between the 
danger and the defendant’s own conduct is “too remote, . . . there 
is no duty.”80 
1. The Special Relationship Exception 
An actor owes a duty of care if a “special relationship” exists 
between the parties and the risk of injury is “foreseeable.”81 
Ordinarily, there is no duty to control the conduct of a 
third person to prevent him from causing physical harm 
to another unless a special relationship exists, either 
 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Clark ex rel. H.B. v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 706 (Minn. 1996). 
 75.  Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127, 128 (Minn. 1999). 
 76.  Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 473 (Minn. 1993). 
 77.  Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 23 (Minn. 2011) (“A duty to act 
with reasonable care for the protection of others arises in two instances implicated 
in this case.”).  
 78.  Whiteford ex rel. Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 
916, 918 (Minn. 1998). 
 79.  Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 382, 95 N.W.2d 657, 664 
(1959). 
 80.  Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn. 1986). 
 81.  Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 667 (Minn. 2007).  
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between the actor and the third person which imposes a 
duty to control, or between the actor and the other which 
gives the other the right to protection.82 
Three scenarios lead to the existence of a special 
relationship83: relational status,84 assumption of custody,85 and 
assumption of responsibility.86 
2. The Domagala Exception 
Additionally, as Domagala clarifies, a duty of care arises when 
“the defendant’s own conduct creates a foreseeable risk of injury to a 
foreseeable plaintiff.”87 In the 2011 decision, Rolland, an experienced 
skid load operator, agreed to help Domagala, who had no similar 
experience, with landscaping work.88 Rolland controlled the skid 
 
 82.  Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn. 1979) (citing Cracraft v. 
City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979)).  
 83.  See Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 665 (“The first prerequisite to a finding of a duty 
to protect another from harm is the existence of a special relationship between 
the parties. A special relationship can be found to exist under any one of three 
distinct scenarios.”). 
 84.  See Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn. 1989). A 
special relationship may arise due to the status of the parties in relation to one 
another. Id. For example, innkeepers owe a duty to guests, as do common carriers 
to passengers, and landowners to invitees. Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 
(1993). These relationships present “a situation where B has in some way 
entrusted his or her safety to A and A has accepted that entrustment.” Erickson, 447 
N.W.2d at 168. 
 85.  See Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d. at 665. An individual may assume, or may receive 
by grant of law, custody of another person who is “‘deprived of normal 
opportunities of self-protection.’” Id. (quoting Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474 (Minn. 
1993)). In Bjerke, for example, an adult “accepted entrustment” of a child and, 
therefore, also accepted a duty to protect that child from the tortious actions of a 
third party when that adult assumed a “large degree of control” over the child 
visiting the adult’s home. Id. 
 86.  Laska v. Anoka Cnty., 696 N.W.2d 133, 138 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (“‘A 
special relationship may also arise where one accepts responsibility to protect 
another, although there was no initial duty.’” (quoting Lundman v. McKown, 530 
N.W.2d 807, 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995))). For example, “the supreme court 
concluded a special relationship existed between a diabetic boy and two 
individuals—a Christian Science nurse and a Christian Science practitioner—
whom his mother had hired, paid, and entrusted to provide care to him by praying 
during his illness.” Id. (citing Lundman, 530 N.W.2d at 821–23). 
 87.  Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 23 (Minn. 2011) (emphasis 
added). 
 88.  Id. at 19. 
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loader at all times. When rocks jammed the skid loader, Rolland 
would “flutter the hydraulics” to free the debris, though he knew 
that doing so was “very dangerous.”89 After “fluttering” the 
machine’s bucket attachment to loosen a trapped stone, the bucket 
detached and fell onto Domagala’s foot.90 As a result, Domagala 
had three toes amputated.91 
There was no special relationship between Rolland and 
Domagala;92 however, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that 
this fact was not ultimately decisive.93 The court emphasized that 
the duty imposed by the existence of a special relationship is 
“separate and distinct” from the duty that one must act with 
reasonable care.94 When an actor’s own conduct creates a risk of 
harm, a duty of reasonable care is owed, regardless of relational 
status.95 This distinction proved critical to the Doe 169 decision. 
IV. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF DOE 169 
A. Facts 
From 1991 to 1999, Paul Alan Brandon worked as a youth 
pastor at the Maple Grove Assemblies of God Church (Maple 
Grove).96 During this time, Greg Hickle worked at Maple Grove as a 
senior pastor and acted as Brandon’s supervisor.97 In his youth 
pastor position, Brandon had multiple job performance problems, 
including “boundary issues” with youth group participants.98 
Hickle, acting in his supervisory role, “ordered Brandon to stop” 
behaviors such as hosting sleepovers for the youth group 
participants, which were viewed as cause for concern.99 Brandon 
 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 19–20. 
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Id. at 20. 
 93.  See id. at 30. 
 94.  Id. at 23 (quoting Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 320 (Minn. 2001)). 
 95.  Id. at 23. 
 96.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Minn. 2014). 
 97.  Id.  
 98.  Doe 169 v. Brandon (Doe 169 I), No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *2 
(Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 174. 
 99.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 176. 
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was not, however, accused of acting in a sexually inappropriate 
manner with any minors.100 
Due to his job performance and boundary issues, Brandon 
resigned in 1999.101 As a condition of his separation from Maple 
Grove, Brandon agreed to present a letter to prospective employers 
detailing Maple Grove’s concerns.102 Despite his resignation, 
Brandon remained a credentialed member of the Assemblies of 
God Church.103 The Minnesota District Council of the Assemblies 
of God (District Council) recommended the renewal of Brandon’s 
ministerial credentials.104 
As early as 1999, Brandon began volunteering as a youth 
leader at Emmanuel Christian Center of the Assemblies of God, 
Inc. (ECC).105 Brandon did not present ECC with the letter that 
Maple Grove had composed.106 Crucially, Brandon’s ECC volunteer 
youth leader position did not require ministerial credentials.107 As 
such, “the District Council itself did not control or supervise” 
Brandon in his ECC position.108 
In 2004, Hickle left Maple Grove and began working for the 
District Council as secretary and treasurer.109 As Brandon’s former 
supervisor, Hickle knew of, and, indeed, insisted that Brandon 
cease those boundary issues exhibited by Brandon during his time 
at Maple Grove.110 Nevertheless, in his District Council position, 
“Hickle took no action relative to Brandon’s volunteer work at 
ECC.”111 
 
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Doe 169 I, 2013 WL 2302023, at *2.  
 103.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 176. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Doe 169 I, 2013 WL 2302023, at *3. 
 107.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 176. 
 108.  Id. at 177. 
 109.  Id. at 176. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 177. 
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B. Procedural Posture 
1. The District Court Decision 
John Doe 169 (Doe 169), a former ECC youth group 
participant, accused Brandon of sexually molesting him while he 
was at Brandon’s house for a sleepover.112 Subsequently, Doe 169 
brought a negligence claim against the District Council.113 Doe 169 
alleged that the District Council acted negligently when the District 
Council recommended renewal of Brandon’s ministerial 
credentials.114 The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the District Council, finding that it owed no duty of care to 
Doe 169, as the District Council and Doe 169 did not have a special 
relationship.115 Subsequently, Doe 169 appealed the district court’s 
decision, arguing that the district court’s conclusion that the 
District Council owed him no duty of reasonable care was 
erroneous.116 
2. The Minnesota Court of Appeals Decision 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s 
decision and remanded the case back to the lower court.117 The 
appellate court found that the district court’s decision was based on 
a misapplication of law—the absence of a special relationship 
between the District Council and Doe 169 was not wholly 
decisive.118 The District Council likely knew, through Hickle, of 
Brandon’s past inappropriate conduct with minors and had general 
knowledge of sexual abuse by ministers.119 Subsequently, the 
appellate court found that the foreseeability of Doe 169’s injury 
necessitated jury consideration.120 The District Council sought 
review of the appellate court’s decision; a request which was 
granted by the Minnesota Supreme Court.121 
 
 112.  Id. at 176. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Doe 169 I, No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 
2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 174. 
 117.  Id. at *9. 
 118.  Id. at *6. 
 119.  Id. at *7–8. 
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Minn. 2014). 
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3. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s 
holding and reinstated the district court’s summary judgment.122 
The supreme court held that, under Domagala, the District 
Council’s recommendation of credential renewal did not create a 
duty of care to Doe 169, as there was no foreseeable risk of harm.123 
The link between the District Council’s actions and Doe 169’s 
injury, the court held, was simply “too attenuated” for Doe 169’s 
injury to have been a foreseeable consequence.124 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. The Court’s Four Decisive Factors 
The Minnesota Supreme Court based its decision in Doe 169 
on four critical factors: (1) the District Council did not employ, 
supervise, or control Brandon; (2) a separate volunteer application 
process controlled Brandon’s acceptance as a volunteer; (3) 
Brandon spent years volunteering for ECC before the District 
Council came to know of Brandon’s past; and (4) the ECC, not the 
District Council, controlled the determination of an applicant’s 
fitness.125 The court stated that these factors spoke to the 
unforeseeable nature of Doe 169’s injury. Actually, however, these 
factors centered on the control, or lack thereof, the District 
Council exercised over Brandon. 
If the Minnesota Supreme Court intended these factors to 
illustrate that the District Council had little opportunity to know of 
Brandon’s questionable behavior, and, therefore, could not have 
realized the potential danger Brandon posed, then its intention 
fails. The Minnesota Court of Appeals advanced a convincing 
argument that, under the law of agency, Hickle’s knowledge of 
Brandon’s inappropriate behavior was likely imputed to the District 
Council.126 Interestingly, this contention was not addressed at all by 
the supreme court. 
 
 122.  Id. at 179. 
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  See Doe 169 I, No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *16 (Minn. Ct. App. 
May 28, 2013) (arguing that Hickle likely acted as the District Council’s agent, as 
an agency relationship “‘results from the manifestation of consent by one person 
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The crux of the supreme court’s rationale was not 
foreseeability; it was the distinction between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance. The court stated that the issue of the District 
Council’s potential misfeasance was not reached.127 Yet, the court 
largely credited as the basis for its decision the fact that the District 
Council did not exert control over Brandon securing, or operating 
within, his volunteer position. The court did not examine the 
question of whether the District Council had reason to know of 
Brandon’s history. Previously, when the court has examined an 
actor’s level of “control” over a situation, its examination has 
culminated in a discussion of that actor’s level of misfeasance.128 
B. The Difficult Distinction Between Misfeasance and Nonfeasance 
At first blush, the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction 
appears straightforward. However, “in practice it is not always easy 
to say whether an alleged misconduct is active or passive.”129 
Indeed, at times, attempts at distinction prove to be an exercise in 
“profound confusion.”130 Categorizing complex human actions and 
interactions “invites decision-making based on some fragile factual 
characterizations.”131 Consider, for example, a situation in which a 
gun stolen from an unalarmed shop is used as a murder weapon. 
Clearly,   the   individual   who   pulled   the  trigger  committed  an 
 
 
to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and 
consent by the other to so act’” (quoting PMH Props. v. Nichols, 263 N.W.2d 799, 
802 (Minn. 1978))), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 174; see also id. at *17 (arguing that Hickle’s 
knowledge was likely imputed to the District Council, as “‘[k]nowledge of an agent 
acquired previous to the agency, but appearing to be actually present in his mind 
during the agency, and while acting for his principal in the particular transaction 
or matter, will, as respects such transactions or matter, be deemed notice to his 
principal, and will bind him as fully as if originally acquired by him’” (quoting 
Lebanon Sav. Bank v. Hallenbeck, 29 Minn. 322, 326, 13 N.W. 145, 147 (1882))). 
 127.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 179 n.3. 
 128.  See Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Minn. 1984) (arguing that a 
psychiatrist’s ability, and subsequent failure, to control his patient created a risk of 
harm); Olson v. Ische, 343 N.W.2d 284, 290 (Minn. 1984) (arguing that a 
passenger was not in control of an automobile and, thus, was not liable for a 
negligent accident caused by the driver).  
 129.  BOHLEN, supra note 30, at 294. 
 130.  See Rowe & Silver, supra note 32, at 808. 
 131.  Adler, supra note 26, at 881. 
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 affirmative action, but what about the shop owner? One court may 
well decide that the failure to stringently secure the shop was an 
inactionable, passive choice;132 another court may decide that a 
reasonable jury could find that the owner’s lapse in security 
measures constituted affirmative conduct that facilitated the theft 
and, in turn, the murder.133 The subjective quality inherent in this 
distinction, when applied to concrete fact patterns, has the 
potential to “wreak conceptual chaos.”134 
C. The Distinction in Minnesota 
1. Judicial Reluctance 
The Minnesota legal system has a long history of handling the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction warily.135 Over one hundred 
years ago, in 1910, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered 
Brower v. Northern Pacific Railway Co.136 In Brower, a railroad engineer 
failed to correctly replace a gauge, and a worker was injured due to 
this oversight.137 Though the court ultimately decided that the 
engineer’s actions constituted misfeasance,138 the court 
acknowledged that “[t]he thinness and uncertainty of the 
distinction between misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance 
leaves an exceedingly unstable basis on which to rest an important 
 
 132.  See Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 727 A.2d 947 (Md. 1999). 
 133.  See Gallara v. Koskovich, 836 A.2d 840, 843 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
2003) (denying summary judgment to a gun store, as the court decided that a 
reasonable jury could conclude that the gun store’s actions amounted to 
affirmative, actionable negligence). 
 134.  Rowe & Silver, supra note 32, at 808. 
 135.  See Brower v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 109 Minn. 385, 124 N.W. 10 (1910). For an 
early twentieth century discussion of the difficulty of the misfeasance/nonfeasance 
distinction in other courts as well, see Floyd R. Mechem, The Liability of an Agent to 
Third Persons in Tort, 20 YALE L.J. 239, 252 (1911) (“The attempted distinction 
between misfeasance and non-feasance has been very much criticized and often 
denied to exist. It is undoubtedly true that the Latin names employed may not be 
very appropriate or illuminating.”). But see BEEVER, supra note 28, at 205 
(“‘[T]here is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more 
fundamental than that between misfeasance and nonfeasance.’” (quoting Francis 
H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 
217, 219 (1908))). 
 136.  109 Minn. 385, 124 N.W. 10 (1910). 
 137.  Id. at 386, 124 N.W. at 11. 
 138.  Id. at 388, 124 N.W. at 11. 
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principle of liability.”139 A century later, in Domagala, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court demonstrated that this unstable foundation 
remained a fount of concern, and noted “the confounding 
complexity of characterizing a defendant’s action or inaction as 
misfeasance or nonfeasance.”140 
2. Judicial Reliance 
Nevertheless, the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction has 
played a valid and critical role in negligence claims, at times serving 
as a case-determinative element. For example, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Tholkes v. Decock141 and Giefer v. 
Dierckx142 showcase the manner in which the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction can, rather than “wreak 
conceptual chaos,”143 prove to be of “crucial importance.”144 Tholkes 
and Giefer share broadly similar fact patterns. In both cases, 
motorists were injured as a result of defective roadwork. In Tholkes, 
a motorist sustained injuries after driving into an open culvert.145 
Highway repairmen were working to repair the culvert and left the 
culvert exposed, unbarricaded, and “without guards, lights, or 
other warnings.”146 In Giefer, a motorist sustained injuries after 
driving into a bridge washout.147 There had been a torrential 
rainfall, and township officers only managed to barricade one side 
of the washout.148  
Despite these similarities, Tholkes and Giefer had divergent 
outcomes. The issue of liability in Tholkes was a question for the 
jury;149 the defendant in Giefer was excused from liability.150 These 
disparate determinations turned on the misfeasance/nonfeasance 
distinction. The defendant’s actions in Tholkes amounted to an 
 
 139.  Id. (quoting EDWIN A. JAGGARD, 1 HAND-BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 288 
(St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co. 1895)). 
 140.  Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 22 (Minn. 2011). 
 141.  125 Minn. 507, 147 N.W. 648 (1914). 
 142.  230 Minn. 34, 40 N.W.2d 425 (1950). 
 143.  Rowe & Silver, supra note 32, at 808.  
 144.  BEEVER, supra note 28, at 205. 
 145.  Tholkes, 125 Minn. at 508, 147 N.W. at 648. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Giefer, 230 Minn. at 35, 40 N.W.2d at 425. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Tholkes, 125 Minn. at 511–12, 147 N.W. at 649. 
 150.  Giefer, 230 Minn. at 38, 40 N.W.2d at 427. 
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“affirmative act of misconduct.”151 Conversely, the Giefer defendants’ 
failure “to do something more” than barricade one side of the 
bridge washout was deemed nonfeasance and, thus, no liability 
would be imposed as a matter of law.152 
As evidenced by Domagala, the misfeasance/nonfeasance 
distinction maintains its relevancy. In fact, the Domagala court, 
though cognizant of criticisms and complications, urged that the 
distinction is, nonetheless, the conceptual foundation upon which 
the element of duty is built.153 Outside of a special relationship, a 
duty to protect emerges only when the defendant’s own conduct 
gives rise to the risk of harm. That is, the misfeasance/nonfeasance 
distinction is inextricably linked with a finding of an existent duty. 
The court noted that “[t]he distinction between the specific duty to 
warn and exercising reasonable care by giving a warning likely 
stems from the historical divergence of liability for misfeasance and 
nonfeasance.”154 
VI. THE FORESEEABILITY ISSUE 
A. Foreseeability in Doe 169 
Domagala played an integral role in the judicial treatment of 
Doe 169,155 and the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction is integral 
to Domagala.156 It is interesting, then, that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court declined to consider this distinction in Doe 169.157 Instead, 
the court chose to frame its decision around the element of 
foreseeability, despite the fact that the element of foreseeability has 
earned its own fair share of criticism, and, arguably, provides a basis 
for decision that is less stable than the misfeasance/nonfeasance 
 
 151.  Tholkes, 125 Minn. at 511–12, 147 N.W. at 649. 
 152.  Giefer, 230 Minn. at 38, 40 N.W.2d at 427. 
 153.  Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 22 (Minn. 2011); see also Adler, 
supra note 26, at 870 (characterizing the distinction as “judicial hair-splitting”). But 
see Rowe & Silver, supra note 32, at 808 (“The law (if it has a will) never intended 
that nonfeasance and misfeasance should be distinguished, since in logic inaction 
is one form of action.”). 
 154.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 22. 
 155.  See infra Part VI.E. 
 156.  See supra Part V.C.2. 
 157.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 179 n.3 (Minn. 2014) (“Because we decide 
the issue of duty on foreseeability, we need not decide whether what the District 
Council did or did not do after Hickle joined it constituted misfeasance or 
nonfeasance.”). 
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distinction.158 Furthermore, in relying upon the foreseeability 
element, the court ignored contradictory case law, including a 
problematic dual standard presented in Domagala.159 
B.  Palsgraf and the Importance of Foreseeability 
Foreseeability is “often cited as the most important factor in 
duty,” and the use of foreseeability in deciding matters of 
negligence is “nearly ubiquitous.”160 Another Cardozo opinion, the 
infamous Palsgraf decision, exemplifies a situation in which the 
foreseeability element played a critical and clear role.161 In Palsgraf, 
the plaintiff was injured when a railway passenger’s fireworks, 
carried in an unmarked package, exploded after falling onto the 
tracks.162 The New York Court of Appeals held that the station 
guards, who jostled the passenger when it appeared he was in 
danger of toppling onto the tracks himself, were not liable for the 
plaintiff’s injuries.163 Writing for the court, Cardozo explained that 
the guards had no way of knowing that their actions held a 
“potency of peril.”164 The guards had no reason to suspect that the 
unmarked package contained fireworks.165 Nor could the guards 
have reasonably predicted that their interaction with the passenger 
would have any effect on the plaintiff, who stood “at the other end 
of the platform many feet away.”166 The guards were not liable for 
“inadvert[ently]” causing the plaintiffs injuries, as the plaintiff was 
not in the “orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable 
vigilance,” and, thus, was not within the guards’ “orbit of . . . 
duty.”167 
Though Palsgraf was decided nearly a century ago, its lesson 
endures. A defendant should not be liable for an injury that occurs 
outside his, her, or its “range of reasonable apprehension.”168 The 
 
 158.  See infra Parts VI.C–E, VII. 
 159.  See infra Parts VI.E, VII. 
 160.  W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden Legacy of Palsgraf: Modern Duty Law in 
Microcosm, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1884 (2011). 
 161.  Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id.  
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 100–01. 
 168.  Id. at 101. 
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persistence of this lesson is exemplified by the abundance of 
negligence cases that have foreseeability, or lack thereof, as a 
dispositive factor.169 As the Doe 169 court’s analysis shows, however, 
application of this familiar factor is not necessarily an easy or 
straightforward exercise.170 
C. The Problematic Nature of Foreseeability in General Negligence Law 
Difficulties arise when, as is typical, the foreseeability of an 
incident does not involve such clear-cut circumstances as are 
present in Palsgraf. The element of foreseeability in general 
negligence law has been described as “abstract, vague, and 
imprecise.”171 That which is “foreseeable” is based on what a 
“reasonable person in [the] defendant’s position” would expect.172 
This standard is, by definition, inherently subjective and open to 
interpretation, as “both the reasonable man and his foreseeability 
are transparent fictions . . . . They are argumentative words with no 
definite or literal meaning but are capable of absorbing any 
meaning given them.”173 
For this reason, legal scholar William Prosser argued that 
“[f]oreseeability of risk, in short, carries only an illusion of certainty 
in defining the consequences for which the defendant will be 
liable.”174 This illusion quickly begins to unravel upon comparisons 
of discordant court decisions. As Prosser noted, one court may hold 
 
 169.  See, e.g., Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 318 (Minn. 2009) (“[The] 
homeowner did not have a duty to secure an empty bookcase to the wall to 
prevent it from tipping over because it was not reasonably foreseeable that a three-
year-old guest would injure himself by attempting to climb the bookcase.”); 
Whiteford ex rel. Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 919 
(Minn. 1998) (noting that the danger of a child colliding with a stationary 
snowmobile was too remote a possibility to impose a duty on the snowmobile 
manufacturer). 
 170.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 2014). 
 171.  D.E. Buckner, Annotation, Foreseeability as an Element of Negligence and 
Proximate Cause, 100 A.L.R.2d 942 (1965). 
 172.  W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial 
Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 745 (2005) 
(citation omitted). 
 173.  Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1413 
(1960) (“To attempt to draw the line between the foreseeable and the 
unforeseeable in the world of everyday affairs raises even more difficulties than the 
determination of where space leaves off and outerspace begins.”). 
 174.  William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19 (1953). 
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that “the foreseeability of the spread of fire ends at the first 
adjoining house,”175 while another court may deem foreseeable that 
“a mudhole left by a defendant in a highway would stall a car, that a 
rescuer attempting to tow it out would get his wooden leg stuck in 
the mud, and that a loop in the tow rope would lasso his good leg 
and break it.”176 Evidently, foreseeability is a fluid concept open to 
subjective reasoning and perspective. Hence, in Doe 169, while the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals proposed that the District Council’s 
foreseeability was at issue,177 the supreme court found otherwise.178 
D. Further Foreseeability Complications in Minnesota: The Domagala 
Variance 
The foreseeability standards set forth by Minnesota case law 
share the inconsistent nature of broader foreseeability 
definitions.179 A sharper clarification of foreseeability is further 
impeded by recent developments in Minnesota’s negligence law. 
Domagala elucidated that a duty of care may exist outside of a 
special relationship.180 However, Domagala also had the effect of 
further complicating the element of foreseeability in Minnesota.181 
As Professor Mike Steenson noted, a close reading of Domagala 
reveals that the court presented two different foreseeability 
standards.182 On the one hand, the court stated that the test for 
foreseeability is the test outlined in Whiteford: “[W]hether it was 
objectively reasonable to expect the specific danger causing the 
plaintiff’s injury.”183 On the other hand, only a few lines later, the 
court stated that the test for foreseeability “is not whether the 
precise nature and manner of the plaintiff’s injury was foreseeable, 
 
 175.  Id.  
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Doe 169 I, No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 
2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 2014). 
 178.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 179. 
 179.  See Mike Steenson, The Domagala Dilemma—Domagala v. Rolland, 39 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 633, 663 (2013).  
 180.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
 181.  See Steenson, supra note 179. 
 182.  Id. at 651. 
 183.  Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 27 (Minn. 2011) (citing Whiteford 
ex rel. Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 
1998)). 
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but whether ‘the possibility of an accident was clear to the person 
of ordinary prudence.’”184 
E. Domagala and Doe 169: The Domagala Variance Remains 
Unaddressed 
Domagala factored heavily in the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ 
analysis of Doe 169’s negligence claim.185 Notably, in its discussion 
of the foreseeability of Doe 169’s injury, the court of appeals cited 
the more lenient test presented in Domagala.186 Under this analysis, 
the court found that the foreseeability of Doe 169’s injury was a 
proper question for a jury.187 The court further discussed the 
District Council’s knowledge, via Hickle, of Brandon’s “history of 
inappropriate relationships with young boys.”188 Although 
acknowledging that there were no precise incidents of sexual 
misconduct, the court noted that the generally known fact that 
sexual abuse by church authority figures “occurred and was a 
problem.”189 The court reasoned that this general knowledge, 
combined with Hickle’s insight, provided “sufficient evidence to 
create questions for the jury” as to whether Doe 169’s injury was 
reasonably foreseeable.190 
Despite the court of appeal’s considerable reliance on 
Domagala, the supreme court appeared to overlook the fact that, in 
Domagala, “the duty formulations vary.”191 The supreme court 
acknowledged the Domagala exception, but then adopted a 
foreseeability standard without expressly recognizing or addressing 
the duty formulation variance and the “precise nature and 
manner” caveat of Domagala.192 In so doing, the supreme court 
avoided the issue of Domagala’s incongruence.193 
 
 184.  Id. (quoting Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 382, 95 N.W.2d 
657, 664 (1959)). 
 185.  See Doe 169 I, No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *5–8 (Minn. Ct. App. 
May 28, 2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 2014). 
 186.  Id. at *7 (stating that the test utilized by the court of appeals did not 
require that the “precise nature and manner” of Doe 169’s injury be foreseeable). 
 187.  Id. at *8 (“Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to appellant, 
whether Brandon’s sexual abuse of appellant was a foreseeable harm is an issue for 
the jury.”). 
 188.  Id. at *17. 
 189.  Id. at *21. 
 190.  Id. at *7–8.  
 191.  Steenson, supra note 179, at 651. 
 192.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Minn. 2014) (“[W]e ‘look at whether 
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss1/13
 
2015] DOE 169 V. BRANDON 389 
Due to the supreme court’s failure to address and clarify the 
Domagala variance, it remains applicable law. This is a troubling 
prospect. As Professor Steenson noted, the two differing standards 
presented by the Domagala decision may very well be outcome 
determinative.194 As the highest court in the state, the supreme 
court’s decisions “contribute importantly to public policy 
nationwide,”195 public policy that is “directly relevant to the lives of 
most citizens.”196 “Adherence to past rulings gives predictability and 
continuity to the law.”197Allowing Domagala to stand, unaddressed, 
does exactly the opposite and allows for “the dangerous possibility 
that judges will decide cases on a momentary whim or with an 
individualistic sense of right and wrong.”198 
Doe 169 incorporates the very essence of the problem that the 
dual standards of the Domagala variance presents. The less stringent 
foreseeability threshold is met if a reasonable person might have 
foreseen the possibility of an accident, even if not the exact 
accident that occurred; the steeper threshold is met if a reasonable 
person could have foreseen the exact injury that did occur. The 
former threshold leaves the door wide open for negligence 
litigation. The term “possible accident” is so vague as to invite 
almost any adverse event as the basis for a case. In addition, in cases 
involving serious injury, foreseeability could be found, even if only 
minor injury could have been foreseen. Minnesota negligence law 
could benefit from stricter, more clearly defined limits. The latter 
Domagala threshold provides exactly that. 
 
the specific danger was objectively reasonable to expect . . . .’” (citing Whiteford ex 
rel. Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 
1998))). 
 193.  See id. at 179 (noting that, though the court “applies the framework of 
Domagala,” it does not address the two test formulations present in Domagala). 
 194.  Steenson, supra note 179, at 653–54. 
 195.  Henry R. Glick, Policy Making and State Supreme Courts, in THE AMERICAN 
COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 115 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 
1991). 
 196.  Id. at 87. 
 197.  ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 
286 (5th ed. 2001). 
 198.  Id. 
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VII. FORESEEABILITY QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED 
Like this dual foreseeability standard, the foreseeability factors 
listed by the appellate court—Hickle’s knowledge of Brandon’s 
past inappropriate behavior;199 the existence of, to borrow a term 
from a previous Minnesota Court of Appeals case,200 “red flags;”201 
and Hickle’s general knowledge that sexual abuse by religious 
authority figures was a commonly known hazard202—were ignored 
by the supreme court.203 The Minnesota Supreme Court failed to 
address these factors entirely, which was a curious choice. For 
better or worse,204 state case law appears to support the court of 
appeal’s decision. 
A. Knowledge of Inappropriate Behavior 
First, the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered the fact that 
the District Council, through Hickle, had knowledge of “Brandon’s 
inappropriate boundaries and conduct with male youths while 
 
 199.  Doe 169 I, No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 
2013) (“Through Hickle, respondent knew about Brandon’s history of . . . 
maintaining inappropriate relationships, and boundary issues with young boys. 
Respondent knew that . . . Brandon gave one youth leg and back rubs.”), rev’d, 845 
N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 2014). 
 200.  C.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am., 726 N.W.2d 127, 
136 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
 201.  See Doe 169 I, 2013 WL 2302023, at *8 (“Respondent knew that Brandon 
continued to host sleepovers with male youths even after Hickle directed him to 
stop [and] that two youths complained that they felt uncomfortable when 
Brandon insisted that they sleep in his bed with him . . . .”). 
 202.  Id. (“Hickle acknowledged that by the late 1980’s ‘it was widely known’ 
that sexual abuse of children by ministers and youth workers occurred and was a 
problem. Hickle wrote an article about the prevention of sexual abuse of children 
in the ministry context that was published in a newsletter available to churches 
and ministers affiliated with respondent. Slagg testified that sex abuse is a well-
known hazard of ministering to children.”). 
 203.  See supra Part V.A for a discussion of those factors considered decisive by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court in reaching the Doe 169 conclusion. 
 204.  The policy implications of the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision 
were troubling to many. See e.g. Brief and Appendix of Amicus Curiae Minnesota 
Religious Council at 10, Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174 (No. A12-1721), 2013 WL 
8481219, at *10 (“[A]ll that [was] necessary to impose a duty on a defendant to 
protect a third party from injury is the defendant’s ‘certification’ (or some similar 
act) regarding the tortfeasor and a general societal knowledge that people in the 
tortfeasor’s position may cause injury to others.”). 
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Brandon was employed” under Hickle’s supervision.205 Namely, 
Hickle was aware that “Brandon gave one youth leg and back 
rubs.”206 In the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 2007 Bjerke v. Johnson 
decision, the defendant directly witnessed inappropriate 
interactions between a minor and an adult.207 Ultimately, the 
supreme court decided that the issue of whether or not the 
defendant should have reasonably foreseen danger, and the events 
that unfolded, was a question for the jury.208 Unlike Doe 169 and 
the District Council, the Bjerke defendant and victim were in a 
special relationship.209 Nevertheless, the existence of a special 
relationship does not obviate the requirement that the injury in 
question be foreseeable.210 The supreme court found that the 
“inappropriate behavior” demonstrated by the adult male should 
have alerted the Bjerke defendant to the likelihood of imminent 
sexual abuse.211 The Minnesota Supreme Court failed to address 
what makes the inappropriate behavior in Bjerke different from the 
inappropriate behavior in Doe 169. 
B. The Existence of Red Flags 
Second, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has suggested that 
“red flags” may provide sufficient grounds to establish 
foreseeability. For example, in C.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in America, a retired minister sexually molested the 
child of a former parishioner.212 The court of appeals held that the 
particular “red flags” presented by the plaintiff—the child’s 
overnight visits at the abuser’s house, the abuser’s habit of buying 
the child expensive gifts, and the child’s hesitation to visit the 
abuser—were insufficient to render the sexual abuse foreseeable.213 
 
 205.  Doe 169 I, 2013 WL 2302023, at *7. 
 206.  Id. at *8. 
 207.  742 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2007). 
 208.  Id. at 669. 
 209.  Compare id. at 667, with Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Minn. 2014). 
 210.  Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 667 (“Even where a special relationship exists, a 
duty is only imposed if the resulting injury was foreseeable.”). 
 211.  Id. at 668 (“[Q]uestions of material fact exist as to the foreseeability of 
any sexual abuse that occurred . . . . The evidence shows that [defendant] Johnson 
. . . observed unusual and intimate behavior between [the third party] and [the 
injured party] . . . .”). 
 212.  726 N.W.2d 127, 131–32 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
 213.  Id. at 136 (“Even if respondents were aware of the alleged ‘red flags,’ 
appellants fail to establish how these ‘red flags’ should have put respondents on 
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The court stated that as these behaviors were not “abnormal,” and 
they did not render the abuse “objectively foreseeable.”214 This 
seems to suggest, then, that the existence of abnormal behaviors, 
like those behaviors observed on the part of Brandon, can render 
abuse foreseeable.215 The supreme court, however, did not consider 
this issue in its foreseeability discussion.216 
C. The Existence of General Knowledge 
Third, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the 
foreseeability of Doe 169’s injury was a question for the jury, as 
Hickle acknowledged that “‘it was widely known’ that sexual abuse 
of children by ministers and youth workers occurred and was a 
problem.”217 Knowledge that a specific hazard commonly poses a 
risk in a particular field has, in previous decisions, rendered the 
realization of that hazard a foreseeable event.218 
For example, in Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. North Homes, 
Inc., the Minnesota Supreme Court found that an employer, a 
group home, was responsible for the sexual abuse of a minor-
resident by an employee.219 The supreme court deemed the 
foreseeability of the employee’s abuse a question for a jury, as 
“inappropriate sexual contact . . . in [group homes] . . . is a well 
known hazard.”220 Likewise, in Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of 
Psychiatry and Neurology, Ltd., the supreme court found that a clinic 
 
notice of the abuse.”). 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Doe 169 I, No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 
2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 2014). 
 216.  See Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 179 for the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
analysis of the foreseeability element. The court does not address Brandon’s 
inappropriate past actions. 
 217.  Doe 169 I, 2013 WL 2302023, at *8. 
 218.  Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 911–
12 (Minn. 1999) (“[Plaintiff] submitted the affidavit from . . . a purported expert 
in the group home industry, expressly stating that ‘inappropriate sexual contact or 
abuse of power in [group home] situations, although infrequent, is a well known 
hazard in this field.’ This sworn statement, although somewhat conclusory and 
lacking specific examples, is nearly identical to the testimony we relied on 
in Marston in holding that a question of material fact existed on the issue of 
foreseeability.” (citing Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, 
Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn. 1982))). 
 219.  597 N.W.2d 905, 911. 
 220.  Id. 
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was responsible for an employee-physician’s forbidden sexual 
relationships with clients.221 Once again, as “sexual relations 
between a psychologist and a patient is a well-known hazard,”222 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court found that the foreseeability of the 
doctor’s sexual misconduct posed a question of material fact.223 The 
occurrence of sexual abuse within the church is also, unfortunately, 
an all too common occurrence.224 In light of widespread knowledge 
that such abuse occurs, as well as valid Minnesota case law 
supporting the idea that widespread knowledge may serve as a basis 
for foreseeability, the Minnesota Supreme Court should have 
addressed why this general knowledge did not render Doe 169’s 
injury reasonably foreseeable. 
VIII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IMPLICATIONS 
A. The Drastic Nature of Summary Judgment 
Despite the existence of unanswered questions and the 
underlying presence of seemingly contradictory case law, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, rather than remand Doe 169 to the 
lower courts for further examination, reinstated the “drastic”225 and 
“extreme”226 legal remedy of summary judgment.227 Summary 
judgment results in the serious consequence of removing a case 
from the hands of a jury.228 The right to trial by jury, a right 
 
 221.  329 N.W.2d 306, 311. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  See, e.g., Julie Bosman, Settlement in Lawsuit Over Priest Abuse Is Revealed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2014, at us, available at 2014 WLNR 28538070 (discussing “new 
procedures to help protect children from sexual abuse by the clergy . . . .”); Bruce 
Lambert, Lawsuit Goes to Trial Against the Long Island Diocese Over Sexual Abuse of 
Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, at B, available at 2007 WLNR 7180899 
(discussing the “thousands of complaints of sexual abuse involving the Catholic 
Church in the United States in recent years”); Sam Frizell, Papal Commission Wants 
Priests Held to Account, TIME (May 3, 2014), http://time.com/86762/pope-francis    
-catholic-church-commission-abuse/ (discussing the “sexual abuse crisis in the 
Catholic Church”). 
 225.  Preach v. Monter Rainbow, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 320, 325 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 226.  Barry v. City of New York, 933 F. Supp. 2d 416, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 227.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Minn. 2014). 
 228.  See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (“The guarantees of 
jury trial . . . reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be 
enforced and justice administered.”); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to 
Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding 
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expressly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution,229 is “venerate[d] . . . 
as an institution that links the state with both political and civil 
society and helps to make democratic society a reality.”230 
Therefore, a summary judgment motion should be granted only231 
when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and a “party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”232 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has warned that the “blunt 
instrument” of summary judgment “should be employed only 
where it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved.”233 
Minnesota has admonished that summary judgment should be 
wielded with caution234 and applied “only where it is clearly 
 
Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1077 (2003) 
(“Jury trial is both unique and central to the American legal system.”). 
 229.  U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 230.  JOHN GASTILL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION 
PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 192 (2010); see Vikram 
David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 
203, 206 (1995) (“[T]he link between jury service and other rights of political 
participation such as voting is an important part of our overall constitutional 
structure . . . .” (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991))). 
 231.  The drastic nature of summary judgment has made it a controversial 
legal remedy. Some scholars question whether summary judgment manages to 
achieve its goals of economic and judicial efficiency. See John Bronsteen, Against 
Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 547 (2006) (“Summary judgment 
costs more than it saves, both in terms of money and fairness.”); D. Theodore 
Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 909 
(2006) (concluding that, while not enough empirical data exists to reach a 
concrete conclusion, “serious questions” exist as to whether summary judgment is 
“a cost-saving device”). Some scholars critique summary judgment as a wholly 
unconstitutional legal remedy that should never be granted. See Suja A. Thomas, 
Why Summary Judgment Is Still Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professors Brunet and Nelson, 
93 IOWA L. REV. 1667 (2008); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is 
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007). But see Edward Brunet, Six Summary 
Judgment Safeguards, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1165, 1167 (2010) (arguing that “the 
summary judgment process facilitates the identification of the issues in litigation,” 
and “focus[es] the parties’ attention on the quality of the facts and law”). 
Furthermore, Brunet contends that “safeguards”—including “(1) the inherent and 
discretionary ability [of the trial court] to find one issue of disputed fact, (2) 
robust de novo review, and (3) the Rule 56(f) request for a time-out of pending 
discovery”—“exist [to] prevent erroneous grants of summary judgment.” Id. at 
1188. 
 232.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 56.03. 
 233.  Donnay v. Boulware, 275 Minn. 37, 45, 144 N.W.2d 711, 716 (1966). 
 234.  Lundgren v. Eusterman, 370 N.W.2d 877, 882 (Minn. 1985) (noting that 
though each individual case presents a unique situation, “summary judgments are 
30
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applicable.”235 Granting a summary judgment motion is only 
appropriate when “there is then no legally legitimate fact conflict 
for the jury to resolve or fact inference for the jury to draw.”236 
Applying the summary judgment remedy in ambiguous situations, 
Minnesota’s courts have held, is “wholly erroneous.”237 
B. Summary Judgment in Negligence Actions 
Summary judgment motions are rarely granted in negligence 
actions.238 Questions of negligence require close examination of 
circumstances and deliberation as to what is reasonable, ordinary, 
or prudent. As such, these questions are “uniquely suited for jury 
consideration,” and “are usually inappropriate for summary 
judgment.”239 Deciding that an individual acted unreasonably, that 
an injury was foreseeable, or that harm resulted directly from an 
actor’s own conduct are often matters of discretion. This is not to 
say that summary judgment is always inappropriate in a negligence 
claim;240 such a motion may be granted “in the clearest of cases,”241 
 
to be granted with caution”); see also Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 
Minn. 418, 418, 92 N.W.2d 96, 97 (1958). 
 235.  Katzner v. Kelleher, 535 N.W.2d 825, 828 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).  
 236.  Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View 
of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 
164 (1988) (discussing summary judgment at the federal level). 
 237.  See Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 N.W.2d 630, 638 
(Minn. 1978) (“[P]laintiff should be permitted to offer evidence tending to 
establish that young persons . . . were present on the day of the accident and that 
the parking lot was known to be a location for incidents of theft . . . and 
vandalism.”); Sauter v. Sauter, 244 Minn. 482, 485–86, 70 N.W.2d 351, 353 (1955) 
(holding that summary judgment is inappropriate where poor weather conditions 
create questions of material fact pertaining to a driver’s ability to avoid an 
automobile accident); Abo El Ela v. State, 468 N.W.2d 580, 582–83 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1991) (holding that “standards of reasonableness and causation” pertaining 
to a state trooper’s purported negligence are appropriately decided by a jury). 
 238.  10A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2729 (3d ed. 1998). 
 239.  Abo El Ela, 468 N.W.2d at 582–83. 
 240.  See Pond Hollow Homeowners Ass’n v. The Ryland Grp., Inc., 779 
N.W.2d 920, 923–24 (Minn. 2010) (upholding summary judgment against plaintiff 
when plaintiff failed to establish a professional standard of care); Fabio v. Bellomo, 
504 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Minn. 1993) (upholding summary judgment in case of 
purported negligent aggravation of a preexisting medical condition); Kaczor v. 
Murrow, 354 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming summary 
judgment for motorist who had no duty to warn other motorists of a dangerous 
driving situation).  
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in which “the material facts are undisputed and as a matter of law 
compel only one conclusion.”242 In such cases, summary judgment 
does not violate the seventh amendment right to a jury trial, as the 
lack of material evidence would leave a reasonable jury with “no 
acceptable task.”243 
C. Summary Judgment in Doe 169 
With the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning in Doe 169, 
summary judgment was an inappropriately strong judicial remedy. 
In Doe 169, the supreme court acknowledged that “[o]ur case law 
states, without explaining, that in close cases, foreseeability as it 
relates to duty is a jury question.”244 The court then declared that 
“[b]ecause [Doe 169] does not present a close question on 
foreseeability, we decide the question as a matter of law.”245 Case 
law suggests the contrary. Questions of material fact, at least as to 
the foreseeability of Doe 169’s injury, certainly existed. It is 
undisputed that Hickle, a member of the District Council, knew 
about Brandon’s history of inappropriate interactions with 
minors.246 In addition, the District Council certainly knew that 
sexual abuse of minors by church ministers was a reality and a true 
problem within the church.247 Hickle’s first-hand knowledge, along 
with the District Council’s general knowledge, created questions of 
fact as to foreseeability. Therefore, the case should have gone 
before a jury and not disposed of through summary judgment. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Foreseeability and the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction 
play complex and often misunderstood roles in Minnesota tort law. 
Both elements are critically important to questions of negligence; 
however, both elements also are potentially perplexing and garner 
significant criticism for the often unstable manner in which they 
 
 241.  Teas v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 244 Minn. 427, 434, 70 N.W.2d 358, 363 
(1955). 
 242.  Sauter, 244 Minn. at 486, 70 N.W.2d at 354. 
 243.  Stempel, supra note 236, at 164. 
 244.  Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 178 n.2 (Minn. 2014). 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Doe 169 I, No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 
2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 174. 
 247.  Id. at *8.  
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are applied. Foreseeability lacks a clear and standard definition. 
What exactly makes an event, victim, or injury foreseeable is largely 
discretionary.248 Meanwhile, the misfeasance/nonfeasance 
distinction has been described as little more than “semantic play,” 
and applying this differentiation to real world scenarios at times 
proves “impossible.”249 
In an attempt to inject precision into the murky realms of 
foreseeability and misfeasance, states carve out standards through 
case law, statutes, and policy decisions.250 However, despite the 
gravity of foreseeability and the misfeasance/nonfeasance 
distinction, and the bewilderment with which they are often 
approached, Doe 169 presents no clarifications. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s blurred analysis is problematic, beyond simply 
serving as a showcase of the court’s disorientation with the 
Domagala exception.251 The court reinstated summary judgment for 
the defendant in Doe 169, signifying that no other conclusion could 
be reached.252 A decision based on foreseeability, however, calls to 
mind numerous Minnesota Supreme Court decisions in which 
similar facts were considered sufficient to render injury reasonably 
foreseeable to necessitate jury consideration.253 Furthermore, the 
court’s decision confounds, rather than clarifies, the precarious 
spot that the elements of foreseeability and misfeasance occupy in 
Minnesota case law. In fact, the court’s decision, though heavily 
reliant upon the Domagala opinion, overlooks the fact that 
Domagala itself presents a perplexing dual foreseeability standard.254 
In its Doe 169 ruling, the Minnesota Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to specify that foreseeability exists only when specific 
injury could be reasonably predicted. In so doing, it could have—
and should have—eliminated much of the subjective ambiguity 
present in negligence litigation and created a set standard by which 
Minnesota courts could abide. 
 
 248.  See generally William H. Hardie, Jr., Foreseeability: A Murky Crystal Ball for 
Predicting Liability, 23 CUMB. L. REV. 349, 397–98 (1993) (“[N]o one can state a 
clear and unequivocal definition of ‘foreseeability.’”). 
 249.  Adler, supra note 26, at 877. 
 250.  See Cardi, supra note 160, at 1878. (“[W]here duty is not controlled by 
statute or specific common-law rule . . . duty almost universally is articulated as a 
multi-factorial policy decision.”). 
 251.  See Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 178. 
 252.  Id. at 179. 
 253.  See supra Part VII. 
 254.  See supra Part VI.E. 
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